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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(3) (1986). Defendants/appellants submit this brief 
in opposition to the action taken by the Fourth Judicial District 
Court for Utah County, State of Utah, in convicting 
defendants/appellants of burglary, a second degree felony, on 
April 7, 1988. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. 
All three defendants/appellants were found guilty to a charge of 
burglary, a second degree felony, arising out of an altercation 
at the house of the defendants/appellants James L. Sandoval's 
former mother-in-law, LeAnn Preece. Notice of appeal was filed 
on June 22, 1988, with the Utah Supreme Court. The case has 
subsequently been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
defendants/appellants assert that the trial court erred in 
concluding that the defendants/appellants possessed the requisite 
intent necessary to sustain a conviction of burglary, a second 
degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the court committed error in concluding 
that beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendants/appellants entered 
the house of LeAnn Preece on or about September 6, 1987, or 
remained unlawfully therein with the required specific intent as 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978)? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
On April 7, 1988, the defendants/appellants were 
brought before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, 
sitting without a jury. All three defendants/appellants were 
accused by the State of Utah of burglary, a second degree felony, 
and assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court concluded 
that all three defendants/appellants were guilty of burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1978). The trial court concluded further that the count of 
assault was subsumed by the conviction of burglary and therefore 
the charge of assault was dropped against cill three 
defendants/appellants. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about September 18, 1987, a criminal information 
was filed by the State of Utah accusing the defendants/appellants 
James L. Sandoval, Robert L. Sandoval, and Patrick Dominquez of 
burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978), and assault, a Class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978). The first 
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appearance hearing was held on October 2, 1987, and the 
preliminary examination was held on November 30, 1987, with a 
bind-over order being signed by the circuit court judge on that 
date. The defendants/appellants Robert L. Sandoval and Patrick 
Dominquez were brought before the district court on an 
arraignment hearing on or about January 8, 1988. 
Defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval was brought before the 
court on an arraignment hearing on or about January 22, 1988. 
This matter then came on for hearing before the Honorable Cullen 
Y. Christensen, judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, State of Utah, on February 9, 1988. The court 
concluded that trial on the matter be continued due to the 
illness of counsel for the State of Utah. Thereafter this matter 
came on regularly for hearing before Judge Christensen on April 
7, 1988. 
Judge Christensen, sitting without a jury, heard 
testimony presented by both sides and concluded as follows: 
The court has reviewed the 
evidence in this matter and has 
reviewed the law as I see it 
applicable to this case. 
In this matter the defendants 
are each charged with two counts, 
one being burglary, a second degree 
felony in violation of Section 76-
6-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1983, 
as amended, in that they, on or 
about September 6, 1987, in Utah 
County, Utah, did unlawfully enter 
or remain in the dwelling of LeAnn 
Preece, with the intent to commit 
assault upon LeAnn Preece, David 
Preece, and Pamela Sandoval. Count 
II, assault, a Class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of 76-5-102, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that 
they, on or about September 6, 
1987, in Utah County, Utah, did 
knowingly and intentionally 
assault LeAnn Preece, David Preece, 
and Pamela Sandoval, by attempting 
to do bodily injury to LeAnn 
Preece, David Preece, and Pamela 
Sandoval, with unlawful force or 
violence. 
The elements of the charge of 
burglary in this matter appear to 
the Court to be these: 
1. That on or about the 6 th 
of September, 1987, at Utah County, 
Utah, the defendants did unlawfully 
enter or remain in the dwelling of 
LeAnn Preece, 3, with the intent to 
commit an assault upon LeAnn 
Preece, David Preece, and Pamela 
Sandoval, or that they did so 
knowingly and intentionally. 
Burglary is defined in the 
statute, to which reference is made 
in the Information as this: 
"A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or a 
portion of a building with an 
intent to commit an assault on any 
person. Burglary is a felony of 
the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a felony of the second 
degree." 
An assault, by statute, 76-5-
102, is defined as: "An attempt 
with unlawful force or violence to 
do bodily injury to another, or (b) 
a threat accompanied by a show of 
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immediate force or violence to do 
bodily injury to another." 
"An attempt under the law is 
described and defines as for the 
purposes of that part is a person 
is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he 
engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward the 
commission of the offense." 
The term "bodily injury" is 
defined in the statute as being 
"bodily injury means physical pain, 
illness or any impairment of 
physical conditions." And, "a 
statute determines and rules that a 
person enters or remains unlawfully 
in or upon premises when the 
premises or any portion thereof at 
the time of the entry or remaining 
are not open to the public and when 
the actor is not otherwise licensed 
or privileged to enter or remain on 
the premises or such portion 
thereof." 
There's another statute that 
applies, it seems to the Court, in 
this circumstance; and that is 
Section 76-2-202: "Criminal 
responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or for 
conduct of another. Every person 
acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an 
offense, who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, 
c o m m a n d s , encourages or 
intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense, shall be 
criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
The statute further defines 
the words "intentionally, or with 
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intent, or wilfully, or knowingly, 
or with knowledge, as follows:" 
This is Section 76-2-103. 
"Intentionally or with intent or 
wilfully with regard to the nature 
of his conduct, a person engages in 
conduct, intentionally or with 
intent or wilfully with respect to 
the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct when it is 
his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause 
the result." 2. "Knowingly or 
with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or his circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is 
aware of the nature of his conduct 
or the existing circumstances, a 
person acts knowingly or with 
knowledge with respect to a result 
of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result." 
"A person engages in conduct 
with criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct as a result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that circumstances exist or the 
results will occur." 
Now, how does all of that 
apply to the case that we have 
before us today? 
I appears to the Court that it 
has been established beyond any 
reasonable doubt: that the 
incident in this case occurred on 
the 6th of September 1987; that it 
did occur in Utah County; that the 
defendants did unlawfully enter or 
remain in the dwelling of Mrs. 
Preece. 
There is nothing in the record 
in any way to suggest that they had 
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any right to be in that buidling 
[sic], in that dwelling, under the 
circumstances; even though they may 
have been interested in retrieving 
these children. And I think that's 
what their intent was, is to 
retrieve the children. They had no 
legal right, no business going upon 
the premises of Mrs. Preece under 
the circumstances and without her 
permission. 
It's obvious, it's on the 
record, even taking the evidence 
the most favorable to the position 
of the defendants in any respect, 
that they did force their way into 
that building, into that dwelling, 
over the objection of Mrs. Preece 
and of Mrs. Sandoval and of David 
Preece. 
The question then resolves 
down to whether or not they had an 
intent to commit an assault as they 
entered upon that undertaking. 
I think the facts are 
established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that these men were intent 
upon regaining possession, 
irrespective of what it took and 
without any assistance, that they 
were going to do it by self-help. 
The evidence appears to be 
clear and unrefuted that Pamela did 
call James after she got up to her 
mother's and told him that she had 
the children, they were there for 
visitation, and that James said 
"I'm coming to get you"; that 
Pamela felt threatened by that 
circumstance. 
The evidence is certainly 
clear that Robert went in the 
basement door of that dwelling, and 
in a contest with Mrs. Preece over 
the physical possession of the one 
minor child, the testimony of Mrs. 
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Sandoval is that after they got 
into the building that she scuffled 
with Robert in an attempt to get 
her son away from Robert, the 
brother of the father of the child; 
that Robert hit her, on the head, 
that he stomped on her foot. 
The evidence is unrefuted and 
agreed upon that Robert and Mrs. 
Preece engaged in a scuffle over 
the possession of the child, and 
that that scuffle ensued from the 
outside into the building, and that 
Robert pursued the child and Mrs. 
Preece into the building. And the 
Court finds that there is no doubt, 
any reasonable doubt, about the 
fact that Mrs. Preece was pushed 
and shoved and that she did sustain 
inj ury. 
There is no dispute from 
anyone's part that there was a 
considerable amount of scuffling 
and running about in that place, 
there was a lot of anger exhibited. 
And the evidence, irrespective of 
whether or not the poker was 
actually used by James, the 
evidence is clear that he was in a 
position standing over Mrs. Preece 
with the poker in a spear-position 
and only relinquished that position 
when David came upon the scene with 
the gun in his hand and ordered 
them out or that he would shoot. 
It appears to the Court, of 
course intent is a subjective 
thing, no one can look into one's 
mind and tell what is there. The 
only way we can arrive at that is 
by the actions that one undertakes. 
And it appears clear to the Court 
that there can be no doubt, no 
reasonable doubt, that these men 
had the intent to enter that 
building, that they had the intent 
8 
to take whatever steps were 
necessary, to inflict whatever 
injury was necessary to gain 
possession of those children. They 
had the physical force, they had 
the ability, they had a show of 
force. There were three men 
against two women and a child. 
There isn't any question that these 
men, in the view of the Court, were 
acting intentionally, that they 
were acting knowingly, the 
consequences of what they were 
doing; and that evidence of their 
intent to commit assault is further 
substantiated by the fact that they 
did in fact perpetrate and inflict 
injury upon Mrs. Preece and upon 
Mrs. Sandoval. 
So that the case that the 
Court has found and the Court 
believes that the perpetration of a 
battery necessarily implies intent. 
While "intent" may not—"attempt" 
may not imply a battery or a 
completion of the act, the 
completion of the act certainly 
includes the attempt that the 
statute prohibits. 
So the Court, consequently, 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt 
that these men, and each of them, 
did have the intent when they 
entered that building to perpetrate 
an assault upon the occupants 
thereof. 
The Court believes that they 
are each responsible, under the 
circumstances, for the actions of 
the others, since it was a 
concerted effort on their part, 
they were aiding and abetting each 
other when they went into that 
building, and that, therefore, 
under the statute they are all 
three charged as principals. 
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So the Court, consequently, 
finds each of you men guilty of the 
charge contained in Count I of the 
Information. 
With respect to Count II, that 
being the assault charge, it 
appears to the Court that since 
that is necessarily an included 
offense with the Count I of 
burglary, the Court could not find 
them guilty of Count I without 
finding then that they are guilty 
of Count II, that being assault. I 
don't believe that the law would 
permit them to be punished or 
charged[] of[sic] convicted of 
that Count II. 
The Court refers in that 
respect to the case of State of 
Utah vs. Bradley, 19 Utah Advance 
Report 4, which makes reference to 
a case of State vs. Hill, 674 
Pacific 2d 96, and State vs. Baker, 
671 Pacific 2d 152, when it 
indicates that those charges then 
as a matter of law stand in the 
relationship of greater and lesser 
offenses, and the defendant cannot 
be convicted or punished for both. 
So the Court finds in this 
circumstance and believes that the 
finding of guilt on the first Count 
necessarily includes a violation of 
at least Count II and, therefore, 
that they cannot be punished for 
both Counts and that Count II 
should, therefore, for that reason 
be dismissed. 
Transcript of trial, pp. 145-153. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
On May 20, 1988, all three of the defendants/appellants 
were brought before Judge Christensen for pronouncement of 
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judgment. All three were given the same sentence. Each received 
a suspended prison sentence and was placed on probation for 
eighteen (18) months with the following conditions: 
1. Each defendant was to enter an agreement 
with the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department and comply strictly with the 
terms of probation. 
2. Each defendant was to make himself available to 
the Department and the Court when requested to do 
so. 
3. Each defendant was to agree that he would violate 
no laws of the United States, Utah, or any 
municipality wherein he may reside. 
4. Each defendant agreed to pay a $750 fine or 
complete 15 0 hours of Alternative Community 
Service. 
5. Each defendant agreed to make restitution of 
$944.21 or such other sums as agreed upon or 
determined by the Court after a restitution 
hearing. 
6. Each defendant was to serve 30 days in the Utah 
County Jail. The 30 days to be served within the 
next 90 days. If, at the end of 90 days, the jail 
time had not been completed, each defendant was to 
report to the jail and commence serving the 
balance of the jail time. 
The order of commitment of all of the 
defendants/appellants has been stayed pending this appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
D. RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about July 31, 1986, defendant/appellant James L. 
Sandoval was divorced from his former wife, Pamela A. Sandoval, 
and legal custody of his three minor children, Chanay, Shane, 
and Jesse, was awarded to James L. Sandoval. See appendix. It 
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is undisputed that at the time of the occurrence on September 6, 
1987, defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval still retained legal 
custody of those minor children. This fact was admitted at trial 
by Pamela A. Sandoval, Transcript of trial, p. 5. 
On or about September 6, 1987, defendant/appellant 
James L. Sandoval, along with his three children, was visiting 
his parents when his former wife, Pamela A. Sandoval, obtained 
possession of the children without the consent of James L. 
Sandoval. Pamela A. Sandoval admitted at trial that she neither 
notified nor asked James L. Sandoval for permission to take the 
children. Transcript of trial, pp. 8., 17. At trial, Pamela A. 
Sandoval stated that she "merely took the children." Transcript 
of trial, p. 16. That Pamela A. Sandoval did not request 
permission to take the children is also supported by the 
testimony of James L. Sandoval at trial. Transcript of trial, p. 
113. 
Upon discovering the absence of the children, James L. 
Sandoval immediately called the police. This fact is supported 
by the testimony of Officer Philip Webber at trial. Transcript 
of trial, p. 58. After notifying the police that the children 
had been taken, the defendants/appellants James L. Sandoval, his 
brother, Robert L. Sandoval, and a friend, Patrick Dominquez, 
proceeded to search for the whereabouts of the children. 
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The defendants/appellants first proceeded to the house 
of Robert L. Sandoval's ex-wife. This is supported by the 
testimony at trial by Robert Sandoval and Patrick Dominquez. 
Transcript of trial, pp. 92, 102. Upon discovering that the 
children were not at this location, defendant/appellant James L. 
Sandoval called the police for a second time requesting police 
assistance in obtaining possession of his children. This is 
supported by testimony of Officer Webber as well as testimony of 
Robert L. Sandoval. Transcript of trial, pp. 59, 83. 
The defendants/appellants then proceeded to the house 
of Pamela A. Sandoval's mother, LeAnn Preece, in an attempt to 
find the children there. Upon arriving at the Preece residence, 
the defendants/appellants saw that the children were outside on 
the lawn with Pamela A. Sandoval and Mrs. Preece. This is 
supported by the testimony at trial of Pamela A. Sandoval and 
Robert Sandoval. Transcript of trial, pp. 10, 83. 
At trial, Robert Sandoval testified that the 
defendants/appellants had discussed the possibility that 
Pamela A. Sandoval might take possession of the children and 
leave the state. Transcript of trial, p. 83-84. This is 
supported by the testimony at trial of James L. Sandoval wherein 
he stated that Pamela A. Sandoval had threatened to take the 
children from him on various occasions. Transcript of trial, pp. 
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112, 119. Against this backdrop, the defendants/appellants 
entered the house whereupon a scuffle ensued resulting in slight 
bodily injuries. There is ample support in the record to 
indicate that the defendant/appellants were attempting to regain 
possession of the children throughout the scuffle. For example, 
Robert Sandoval testified that he was involved in a pulling match 
with Mrs. Preece in an attempt to obtain possession of the minor 
child Jesse. Transcript of trial, p. 86. This fact is also 
substantiated by the testimony of Pamela A. Sandoval. Transcript 
of trial, p. 12. Moreover, David Preece, witness for the State 
of Utah, stated that Robert Sandoval entered the home,, then ran 
past David Preece "to look upstairs for the children." He then 
testified that Robert Sandoval "didn't attempt to hit him or 
anything." Transcript of trial, p. 54. 
The defendants/appellants were subsequently arrested, 
tried, and convicted of burglary, a second degree felony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, wrongly 
concluded that the defendants/appellants possessed the specific 
intent necessary to sustain a conviction for burglary. Testimony 
contained in the record clearly supports the assertion made by 
the defendants/appellants that they entered possession the 
premises of the Preece residence with the intent to regain 
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possession of the children who were lawfully within the custody 
of defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval. Because of this error, 
the defendants/appellants were wrongfully convicted of burglary, 
a second degree felony, and that conviction should be reversed by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS POSSESSED THE SPECIFIC 
INTENT REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF 
BURGLARY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN, S 76-6-202 
(1978). 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, concluded that 
the defendants/appellants entered the premises of Mrs, Preece 
with the intent to do "whatever was necessary" to regain 
possession of the children. That conclusion does not satisfy the 
specific intent requirement which is set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978) as follows: 
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty 
of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft 
or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of 
the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In Utah, burglary is a "specific intent" crime. The 
intent called for under the Utah Code is specific intent to 
commit a "felony, theft or assault." In order to sustain a 
conviction on a charge of burglary, the specific intent must be 
proved, or circumstances shown from which the intent may be 
reasonably be inferred. State v. Clements, 488 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1971). 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the differences 
between crimes with specific intent as opposed to crimes of 
general intent in the case of Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 
1978) . Beginning at page 369 of the reported opinion, the Utah 
Supreme Court states as follows: 
We recognize, of course, that most 
crimes require a criminal intent in 
the doing of the act prohibited. 
Some require only a general intent 
to do an act, which is evil in 
itself. Examples are acts like 
murder, rape, kidnapping, which are 
said to be malum in se. In such 
circumstances, a person is presumed 
to intend the natural consequences 
of his act and the general criminal 
intent with which an act was done 
may be inferred from the words and 
conduct of the actor. 
There are other crimes which 
require a specific intent. In them 
the prosecution must prove the 
intent with which the act was done. 
For example, the elements of the 
crime of burglary are: (1) the act 
of entering a building, and (2) the 
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specific intent to commit a "fel-
ony, theft or assault11 therein. 
The entering of a building is not 
inherently evil, and that act alone 
does not give rise to a presumption 
or an inference that the actor 
entered with the requisite intent 
to constitute burglary. In 
addition to the entry, the intent 
to commit a "felony, theft or 
assault" therein must be proved, or 
circumstances shown from which the 
intent may reasonably be inferred. 
Id. at 369-370 (emphasis added). 
The specific intent necessary to sustain the conviction 
of the defendants/appellants could not be reasonably adduced from 
the evidence presented at trial. The record is deplete of 
evidence to contradict the defendants/appellants1 assertion that 
they entered the home of Mrs. Preece with the intent of regaining 
possession of the children within the lawful custody of 
defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval. Moreover, the record 
indicates that the trial judge erroneously based the conviction 
of the defendants/appellants upon a finding of general intent, 
not of specific intent as called for by the statute. 
Beginning at page 149 of the trial transcript, the 
trial judge's comments are recorded as follows: 
The question then resolves 
down to whether or not they had an 
intent to commit an assault as they 
entered upon that undertaking. 
I think the facts are estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt, 
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that these men were intent upon 
regaining possession [of the 
children of James L. Sandoval!, 
irrespective of what it took and 
without any assistance, that they 
were going to do it by self-help. 
(Emphasis added.) 
At this point in the trial, the record indicates that 
the trial judge clearly recognized that the defendant/appellants 
possessed the intent of regaining possession of the children upon 
entering Mrs. Preece's house. At page 150 of the trial 
transcript, the trial judge concluded that the "evidence is 
certainly clear" that Robert Sandoval was involved in a "contest 
with Mrs. Preece over the physical possession of the one minor 
child." Moreover, the judge then concludes that the "evidence is 
unrefuted and agreed upon that Robert Sandoval and Mrs. Preece 
engaged in a scuffle over the possession of the child," 
In spite of concluding that the defendants/appellants 
possessed the specific intent of regaining possession of the 
children, the trial court then proceeds to conclude that the 
defendants/appellants "had the intent to take whatever steps 
were necessary, to inflict whatever injury was necessary, to gain 
possession of those children." Transcript of trial, p. 151. No 
evidence was presented by the State of Utah which would in any 
way indicate that the defendant/appellants had a predisposition 
to violence upon entering Mrs. Preece's residence. 
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Counsel for defendants/appellants recognizes that the 
specific intent with which entry is made, for purposes of 
burglary, is rarely susceptible of direct proof. As pointed out 
by Judge Christensen it is difficult to know what was in another 
person's mind. However, intent may be "inferred from 
circumstantial evidence: the manner of entry, the time of day, 
the character and contents of the building, the person's actions 
after entry, the totality of the surrounding circumstances, and 
the intruder's explanation. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(Utah 1985); see State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1960); see also State v. 
Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981); State v. Tellav. 324 P.2d 490 
(Utah 1958) . From the record it appears that the trial court 
focused exclusively on the acts of the defendants/appellants 
after entry into the home of Mrs. Preece. The trial court failed 
to take into account that defendants/appellants entered the 
house in pursuit of the children in broad daylight in hopes of 
preventing the children from being absconded or injured. The 
trial court completely disregarded the explanation given at 
trial by the defendants/appellants. 
From the established facts as set forth with 
particularity above, it is unrefuted that in July 1986 the 
defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval obtained a divorce decree 
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from his former wife, Pamela A. Sandoval. In that divorce 
decree the legal custody of the three minor children of their 
marriage was awarded to James L. Sandoval. 
On the Labor Day weekend of 1987, defendant/appellant 
James L. Sandoval, with his three children, was visiting the 
children's paternal grandparents in Utah. While at the home of 
the paternal grandparents, Pamela A. Sandoval obtained possession 
of the children without notifying or obtaining the consent or 
permission of James L. Sandoval. Thereafter, James L. Sandoval 
notified the police and informed them that his children had been 
taken and were suspected to be in the possession of Mr. 
Sandoval•s ex-wife. 
Fearing that the safety of the children was at stake or 
that the children might be transported out of state by Pamela A. 
Sandoval, James L. Sandoval, along with his brother and close 
friend, proceeded to search for the children with the intent of 
regaining possession of them. As legal custodian of the 
children James L. Sandoval had the legal duty and right to the 
custody and care of the children. 
While the record contains a somewhat confused and 
contradictory description of what occurred at the home of Mrs. 
Preece, it remains undisputed that all parties to the altercation 
were concerned with the possession and custody of the children. 
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Testimony presented to the trial court by both the State of Utah 
and the defendants/appellants indicates that there was a struggle 
and anger was displayed over the possession of the minor 
children. Reasonable minds could differ on the allegations that 
assault was committed by the defendants/appellants. The 
testimony of the defendants/appellants supports a contrary 
conclusion that the defendants/appellants were in fact the 
victims not the perpetrators of the alleged assault. 
At the time of entry, defendants/appellants did not 
have the specific intent to commit a "felony, theft or assault." 
While the thought of self-help may have existed upon entry, the 
specific underlying intent was to recover possession of the 
children. The trial concluded such, but then wrongfully 
concluded that the defendants/appellants had the "intent to take 
whatever steps were necessary, to inflict whatever injury was 
necessary to gain possession of those children." Transcript of 
trial, p. 151. This conclusion evidences the trial court's error 
of confusing and interchanging the general intent of the 
defendants/appellants with their specific intent. The intent to 
"take whatever steps were necessary" is an extremely broad, 
inclusive statement. Includable within this intent would be 
acts, both violent or nonviolent, passive or active, overt or 
covert. Surely such a broad intent is not within the much more 
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narrowly defined specific intent called for by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202. 
The specific felonious intent must exist at the time of 
entry, and if it is not formed in the mind of the offender, there 
is no burglary. The Utah Supreme Court recognized this principal 
long ago in the case of State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950 
(1929) where it held in a prosecution for second degree burglary 
that the intent with which the defendant entered the structure 
was the crux of the case. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has 
subsequently stated that the mere unlawful entry into private 
premises may not alone support a finding of intent. State v. 
Pitts. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986). 
The facts presented at trial substantiate the 
defendants/appellants assertion that their specific intent upon 
entering Mrs. Preece's house was to regain possession of James L. 
Sandoval's children. The State presented no evidence to indicate 
a contrary intent of the defendants/appellants. In fact, the 
testimony of David Preece cited above would indicate that clearly 
the defendant/appellant Robert L. Sandoval had no intention to 
assault anyone. Robert did, after all, run past David without 
any threat of violence whatsoever. Hence, at that point in time 
—Robert's entry into Mrs. Preece's house—the evidence 
unrefutably establishes the lack of specific intent to commit an 
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assault on the part of Robert L. Sandoval. Moreover, the fact 
that James L. Sandoval repeatedly called the police before going 
to the Preece residence indicates his intent to avoid violence. 
With regard to all three defendants/appellants the State of Utah 
relies exclusively upon the alleged acts of assault which 
allegedly took place once the defendants/appellants were in Mrs. 
Preecefs house. No evidence presented substantiated the State's 
claim that defendants/appellants had the specific intent to 
assault upon entering Mrs. Preece's house. It is fundamental 
that "the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt each element of an offence." State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 
222 (Utah 1986). Because that burden has not been met, 
defendants/appellants ask the Utah Court of Appeals to overturn 
the trial court's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
To sustain a burglary charge under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202, the State must prove that the defendants/appellants 
possessed a specific intent to commit a felony, theft or assault. 
The defendants/appellants respectfully assert that the trial 
court erred in concluding that such a specific intent existed. 
The evidence contained in the record indicates that the 
defendants/appellants entered the premises owned by Mrs. Preece 
with the specific intent of regaining possession of the minor 
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children of James L. Sandoval. There is not sufficient evidence 
contained in the record to support the decision of the trial 
court that the defendants/appellants entered Mrs. Preece's house 
with the specific intent to commit an assault while on the 
premises. Statements by the trial court would indicate confusion 
between the concept of general intent and the concept of specific 
intent. 
Given the totality of the circumstances, the 
defendants/appellants maintain that evidence was not presented 
upon which the trial court could reasonably conclude that the 
defendants/appellants had specific intent to commit an assault. 
The trial court erred in concluding that such an intent existed 
and in convicting the defendants/appellants of burglary, a 
second degree felony. Based upon the foregoing analysis and 
authority, the defendants/appellants respectfully reojuest that 
the conviction handed down by Judge Cullen Y. Christensen of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, be 
reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on September , 1988. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
J. Bruce Reading 
Attorney for 
Defendants/Appellants 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing brief of defendants/appellants to be 
served via first-class, postage prepaid, mail on the day of 
September, 1988, addressed to attorney for plaintiff/respondent: 
Mr. Steven B. Killpack, Utah County Attorney, 37 East Center 
Street, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601. 
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APPENDIX 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, ENTERED JULY 31, 1986, BY 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CASE NO. CV-86-864 
F H BUTTERFIELD 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
140 West, 800 North, Suite 204 
Orem, Utah 84057 
225-4170 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
JAMES LINDSEY SANDOVAL, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
PAMELA ANNE SANDOVAL, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. CV 86 864 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The Court having now made and entered its Findings OF Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in this matter, and the Court now being fully 
advised; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff, James Lindsey Sandoval is hereby awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Pamela Anne Sandoval, the same to 
become final forthwith when signed by the Court and entered in the Register 
of Actions in the Office of the Utah County Clerk, and the parties are 
hereby restored to the status of single and unmarried persons. 
2. The care, custody and control of the three minor children 
of the parties, Chanay, Shane and Jesse Sandoval is hereby awarded to the 
Plaintiff, subject to reasonable rights of visitation of the Defendant. 
3. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded, and the Defendant is 
herebe ORDERED TO PAY TO THE Plaintiff the sum of £hftlEJ00 per month, 
per child as child support, the same to commence with the month of 
^ yo, <?o 
August, 1986. Like sums of 4*SdSftfr per month per child are to be 
paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff each and every month 
thereafter until the further Order of the Court, 
4. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
5. Each party is awarded the personal property which he/she 
now has In his/her possession. 
6. The Court retains jurisdiction to issue an Order of 
Withhold and Deliver upon the employer of the Defendant, should she 
become delinquent in hersupport payments more than thirty days. 
7. ThezB*&mtmBT*La Ordered to maintain medical and dental 
insurance coverage on the minor children where the same is available 
at her place of employment. 
8. The Plaintiff Is hereby awarded Judgment, as against 
the Defendant in the sum of $250.00 for the use and benefit of his 
attorney in this matter. 
DATED and Signed at Provo, Utah County, State of UTAH, 
ON THIS day of , 1986. S/— j£*^ 
BY THE COURT: 
